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Beggaring thy neighbor at the
state and local level
Ryan H. Murphy
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to address a growing empirical literature which measures the size of the
fiscal multiplier at the state and local levels. This literature generally fails to consider the reaction
function of the central bank, which typically should be expected to offset local increases in spending by
reducing it elsewhere in the currency area. This is true under rather orthodox assumptions, such as an
inflation targeting central bank meeting its target.
Design/methodology/approach – The author reviews prominent examples of the literature and
establishes the extent to which the empirical methodology avoids the issue he raises. Subsequently, the
author discusses its importance.
Findings – Certain papers in the literature, especially Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), are careful
about the issue. Most papers reviewed, however, are not.
Practical implications – There are severe limitations to papers using thesemethodologies. They are
either contingent on very specific assumptions regarding central banks or lack policy relevance. Earlier
methodologies, such as vector autoregression and the “narrative” method, deserve higher relative
credence among methodologies applied to studying the size of the fiscal multiplier.
Originality/value – The current literature either entirely ignores the issue raised here or it is very
briefly brushed aside. Considering the orthodoxy of the assumptions, at the very least, the issue
deserves far greater recognition in the future. It may demand a broader re-evaluation of the family of
methods.
Keywords Fiscal federalism, Fiscal policy, Macroeconomic policy, Local multipliers
Paper type Viewpoint
1. Introduction
Recent empirical work assessing the size of the fiscal multiplier has considered the
effects of state and local spending on output and employment, instead of more
traditional cross-national comparisons (for literature reviews, see Ramey, 2011 and
Fuchs-Schuendeln, and Hassan 2015). Many of these studies are powerful
econometrically and rhetorically, as they use the methodologies associated with the
“Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics” (Angrist and Pischke, 2010), meaning
that numerous endogeneity or causality concerns are no longer present. This note takes
no issue with the identification methods used by these papers; they are indeed
persuasive. The issue I raise is their interpretation regarding their “general equilibrium”
effects once other regions within a currency area are taken into consideration.
Empirically, this argument finds some support in Dupor (2016).
A common starting point is that the multiplier measured in a given state or province,
for example, is understated, because it ignores potential spillovers of this state’s
spending on its neighbors. If the state of NewYork builds a bridge in NewYork City and
JEL classification – E62, R58





Received 7 July 2016
Accepted 22August 2016
Journal of Financial Economic
Policy

















































we measure the subsequent increase in gross state product of New York, we ignore the
spillover spending effects in New Jersey and Connecticut. If this were the end of the
story, then the measured multiplier would be the lower bound for the size of the
multiplier. However, if the central bank of the currency area is meeting a nominal target,
it will react to any unexpected increase in aggregate demand in one region of the
country, implicitly, by cutting aggregate demand elsewhere. Otherwise, it would not
meet its target. In other words, local multipliers resulting in positive overall multipliers
in a currency area require very passive central bank policy functions to exist. The
conditions under which the measured multipliers should be interpreted as anything but
beggaring aggregate demand from other localities must be considered special, not
general. Outside liquidity traps, this point is wholly consistent with the New Keynesian
model.[1]
Not all literature has ignored the concerns I wish to address. In particular, Nakamura
and Steinsson (2014) measure the effects of state and local spending relative to other
states by “differencing out” the effects of national fiscal and monetary policy. Bruckner
and Tuladhar (2014) find evidence consistent with the idea that the estimates of the
regional multiplier should be viewed as an upper bound, not the lower bound for the
“true” multiplier, given the possibility of national countercyclical monetary policy
(in Japan, no less, making it a particularly strong finding). Jalil (2012) provides a
powerful demonstration of the importance of considering monetary policy more
generally. This note will review the literature on local multipliers as they relate to
general equilibrium effects and offer an alternative interpretation of how this research
should be framed.
2. Literature review
Unlike the articles referenced in the Introduction, most literature does not consider the
response of a central bank, and, when it does reference it, it is often contained in a single
sentence or paragraph.[2] Sometimes, monetary policy is “controlled for”, but this is
insufficient; it must be a conscious component of the modeling technique, as in
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). Alternatively, it can be explicitly and carefully
addressed, as in Bruckner and Tuladhar (2014). Onemay dispute whether inflation (and
aggregate demand) is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, but it does not
matter how good an identification strategy is if the model does not allow for the
possibility of monetary offset occurring across and within a currency area. Moreover,
studies in addition to those discussed belowmake similar mistakes, but the issue is less
germane to them.[3] In this section, I also do not discuss the point estimates of the local
multipliers, as they are simply not essential tomy argument. The argument is supported
by Dupor (2016), who finds drastically different and lower multipliers when considered
in aggregate, as opposed to only the effects of spending within individual states.
Often, the external effects of local fiscal stimulus are thought of in terms of spillover
effects. An early example of measuring a spillover effect of government spending from
one region to another can be found formally in Davis et al. (1997). Serrato and
Winegender (2014) find positive spillovers across counties. Although they acknowledge
the possibility that the spillovers are negative (though through shifting the supply of
labor across counties), they note that their methodology cannot address “the impact of
monetary policy in response to a fiscal shock.” Wilson (2012, pp. 251-52) gives reasons
















































regarding the central bank, they actually argue that the state-level data are preferable,
as monetary policy is constant across the country. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) use
states’ prerecession levels of Medicaid as an instrument for the level of relief aid for
Medicaid states received as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and
explicitly ignore general equilibrium effects, noting deep within the paper that”:
[…] [g]iven that the results from this cross-state approach do not incorporate general
equilibrium effects, cross-state multipliers, or the response of the monetary authority, we
interpret this multiplier as only suggestive of the national multiplier of policy interest (138).
In a working paper similar to Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2012,
p. 7) note in passing that their calculationmay be entirely contingent on the central bank
being unable to stimulate at the zero lower bound.[4]
Still, others do not account for the general equilibrium effects at all, such as Clemens
and Miran (2012). Corbi et al. (2014) measure the positive local spillover, finding a small
effect that is only sometimes statistically significant; monetary policy is controlled for,
but total general equilibrium effects are not accounted for. Acconcia et al. (2014) also
control for national monetary policy but do not account for general equilibrium effects.
Shoag (2013) uses spending changes associated with public investment returns to
identify the multiplier, concluding:
[…] [w]hile these results should be interpreted cautiously, the mounting evidence from a
number of different studies on local, windfallmultipliers suggests a growing consensus on this
issue, both generally and post-2008.
The generality of the result may hold for the locality, but under normal macroeconomic
conditions with monetary offset, this is a calculation of beggar-thy-neighbor, not
increasing output overall for the currency area.
Of the eight primary examples cited in text above (and explicitly setting aside
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014 and Bruckner and Tuladhar, 2014), I should note that
none are at all on the fringes of the profession. Acconcia et al. (2014) and Shoag (2013)
published their studies inAmerican Economic Review, and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012),
Clemens and Miran (2012) and Wilson (2012) published their studies in American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Corbi et al. (2014) and an earlier version of study by
Feyrer and Sacerdote (2012) were published in NBER Working Papers. Serrato and
Winegender (2014) is a working paper that did not appear at NBER, but it has 85
citations to it, according to Google Scholar.
What follows is an important aside. A separate strand of literature also argues for
the importance of agglomeration – network effects and increasing returns to scale –
for the development of local economies (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999), which has at
least at a time found support among a wide range of economists (Easterly, 2001, pp.
145-169; Glaeser et al., 2003). However, this literature on agglomeration effects can
easily be confused with traditional Keynesian multipliers (and vice versa). For
example, Moretti (2010), in an article simply titled “Local Multipliers”, provides
baseline results for the effects of exogenous increases in the number of jobs in the
tradeable and non-tradeable sectors, as well as skilled versus non-skilled jobs.
Greenstone et al. (2010) documents this more extensively by examining the effects of
large plant openings on subsequent levels of total factor productivity. Ultimately,
the evidence is mixed and incentives may only have the intended effects under
















































at other supply side effects of regional aid, which may too be interpreted as an
entirely different type of multiplier (Becker et al., 2010, 2013). It is too easy, however,
to conflate any of these effects with the effect of general government spending; if
anything, terminology should be adjusted to reflect that, for example, the tax
incentives for agglomeration are meant to address what amounts to a network
externality. They may be policy-relevant, but must be thought of separately from
the Keynesian multiplier.
To summarize, there are eight primary examples of papers that either altogether
ignore the problem of central bank responses to local increases in aggregate demand
or do not pay sufficient attention to it. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and Bruckner
and Tuladhar (2014) address the issue appropriately. Other, less closely relevant
examples of this problem exist. Elsewhere, there are still other studies which
calculate local multipliers which should not be conflated with the traditional
Keynesian multiplier. A correct interpretation of studies measuring the multiplier
requires making monetary policy a key component of all analyses.
3. Role of the central bank
Any discussion of the size of the multiplier must be contingent on the response of the
central bank (Sumner, 2013). The foremost questions are whether the central bank is
able to control an economy’s nominal variables and whether it is targeting one of
them. If the economy is not in a liquidity trap and the central bank is targeting
inflation, then the answer to both of these questions is presumed to be “yes”. In that
case, it must be presumed that all calculated local multipliers come directly at the
expense of other localities within the currency area. If there are positive spillovers
for a neighboring community, that too comes at the expense of others more distant
but within the currency area.
That result is simply arithmetical. The national rate of inflation can be thought of
as a weighted average of inflation across regions. If one region pushes its rate of
inflation above where it would otherwise be via fiscal stimulus, this necessarily
means that the central bank must react such that disinflation or deflation in the rest
of the country occurs so as to hit the central bank’s target overall. If a region is able
to force the central bank to overshoot its target, it would raise the question as to why
the regional legislative body is more knowledgeable in determining the national
inflation target and why the central bank would fail to take this into consideration in
the future.
Suppose the central bank is unable to control nominal variables. If the liquidity
trap is binding, this may be true, but it does not necessarily cohere with much of
modern macroeconomics. This is why prominent members of the profession must
awkwardly qualify their statements in favor of fiscal stimulus with phrases such as
“the central bank is unable or unwilling to but in any case does not, provide
additional stimulus through quantitative easing or other means” (Delong and
Summers, 2012, p. 236). Delong and Summers must appeal to a central bank’s
“unwillingness” to engage in alternative policies such as quantitative easing for
fiscal stimulus to still be relevant. Alternatively, a “modern monetary theorist”
would assert that the central bank has no ability to offset the actions of local
governments (Wray, 2012), in which case, these multipliers could actually be taken
















































It is also possible that the central bank could be following another rule or target
where offset would not be implied. It is incumbent on the proponent of local stimulus
spending to show that the central bank is doing so. Even in the USA, following the
crisis, the Fed has appeared to target approximately 4 per cent nominal gross
domestic product (NGDP) growth since 2010, low levels of inflation
notwithstanding. Regardless, a local multiplier corresponding to a multiplier
greater than zero for the total currency area requires assumptions that are typically
untrue. The local multiplier is in no way “general” for this reason.
This literature is regressive in other ways. Although the econometric
methodology is of higher quality, the general perspectives are disturbingly similar
to anachronistic arguments used by proponents of pork-barrel public works projects
such as sports stadiums:
Typically, such promotional studies project future impact and almost inevitably adopt
unrealistic assumptions regarding local value added, new spending, and associated
multipliers. They often use a regional input-output model that depends on outdated
technical coefficients which are treated as invariant to shifts in supply and demand
(Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000).
This is all true, and it appeared economists agreed (Coates and Humphreys, 2008).
But, if we are willing to let aggregate demand management return to the reasonable
purview of state and local public finance, then there is not very much especially
“wrong” with using input-output analysis as a baseline estimate of the economic
impact of stadium building. From the Keynesian perspective, what is the difference
between building a stadium and building a bridge? Is there a larger multiplier for
concrete purchased to build a bridge than for concrete purchased to build a
stadium?[5] It is difficult to imagine why this literature is not actively being
exploited to pursue greater stadium subsidies, except that no academic economist
feels politically motivated to do so.
This leads to the more general point: evidence that heterogeneity within a
currency area is great enough that state and local governments can better target the
appropriate level of aggregate demand is not actually evidence that state and local
governments should try to do so. It is evidence that a country such as the USA is not
an optimal currency area. Monetary policy is still the best way to manage aggregate
demand during normal circumstances, per the New Keynesian consensus (Delong,
2000). Should monetary policy for the currency area be too blunt of a tool to manage
aggregate demand within it, alternative regimes should be considered, whether that
means a monetary system better at taking advantage of the price-species flow
mechanism, more monetary powers devolved to regional banks or something else
entirely. Fiscal stimulus, even when administered properly, is costly in the absence
of very large multipliers (e.g. self-financing stimulus as a result of “hysteresis”).
4. Conclusion
Empirical studies must make theoretical assumptions both in constructing tests and
interpreting results. It is uncontroversial to claim, especially before the Great
Recession, that central banks target inflation. This must inform any interpretation
of measured local fiscal multipliers. The baseline assumption must be that local
stimulus has no overall effect on the currency area; subnational governments are
















































words, the baseline assumption must be that measurements of local multipliers are
measures of beggaring-thy-neighbor.
As long as multipliers are reported upfront as clearly contingent on either the
theoretical assumption of the liquidity trap holding or on a subset of central bank
policy functions, there is little to object to. Yet, by and large, concerns about how a
central bank may respond are limited to one paragraph or less, if at all. The notable
exceptions of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and Bruckner and Tuladhar (2014)
differ greatly in this respect and deserve to be the starting point for further empirical
research studying local multipliers.
Notes
1. It is debatable whether fiscal policy in the NewKeynesian paradigmwill not be offset even in
a liquidity trap if, for example, the central bank partakes in Svennson ’s (2003) “foolproof”
method of exiting one.
2. The papers cited herein are primarily from the literature review performed by
Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2015, pp. 32-38).
3. Cohen et al. (2011), Fischback and Kachanovskaya (2010) and Fischback and Cullen (2013).
4. The lack of emphasis in Feyrer and Sacerdote (2012) is less problematic considering that the
working paper constrains itself to explaining the effects of the specific stimulus.
5. Of course, the rents from the stadium are more likely to accrue to team owners and players
than to the working class, but rents and spending are completely different concepts.
References
Acconcia, A., Corsetti, G. and Simonelli, S. (2014), “Mafia and public spending: evidence on the
fiscal multiplier in a quasi-experiment”, American Economic Review, Vol. 104 No. 7,
pp. 2185-2209.
Angrist, J.D. and Pischke, J.S. (2010), “The credibility revolution in empirical economics: how
better research design is taking the con out of econometrics”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 3-30.
Becker, S., Egger, P. and von Ehrlich, M. (2010), “Going NUTS: the effect of eu structural funds on
regional performance”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94 Nos 9/10, pp. 578-590.
Becker, S., Egger, P. and von Ehrlich, M. (2013), “Absorbative capacity and the growth and
investment effects of regional transfers: a regression discontinuity design with
heterogeneous treatment effects”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 5
No. 4, pp. 29-77.
Bruckner, M. and Tuladhar, A. (2014), “Local government multipliers and financial distress:
evidence from Japanese prefectures”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 124 No. 581,
pp. 1279-1316.
Chodorow-Reich, G., Feiveson, L., Liscow, Z. and Woolston, W.G. (2012), “Does state fiscal relief
during recessions increase employment? Evidence from the American recovery and
reinvestment act”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 118-145.
Clemens, J. andMiran, S. (2012), “Fiscal policy multipliers on subnational government spending”,
American Economy Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 46-68.
Coates, D. and Humphreys, B.R. (2008), “Do economists reach a conclusion on subsidies for sports
















































Cohen, L., Coval, J., and Malloy, C. (2011), “Do powerful politicians cause corporate downsizing?”,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119 No. 6, pp. 1015-1060.
Corbi, R., Papaioannou, E. and Surico, P. (2014), “Federal transfer multipliers: quasi-experimental
evidence from Brazil”, NBER Working Paper, No. 20751, Cambridge, MA.
Davis, S.J., Loungani, P. andMahidara, R. (1997), “Regional labor fluctuations: oil shocks, military
spending, and other driving forces”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 578, Washington, DC.
Delong, J.B. (2000), “The triumph ofmonetarism?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14 No. 1,
pp. 83-94.
Delong, J.B. and Summers, L.H. (2012), “Fiscal policy in a depressed economy”, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 233-274.
Dupor, B. (2016), “Local and aggregate fiscal policymultipliers”, Federal ReserveBank of St. Louis
Working Paper no. 2016-004A, 29 March.
Easterly, W. (2001),The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures andMisadventures in
the Tropics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Ellison, G. and Glaeser, E.L. (1999), “The geographic concentration of industry: does natural
advantage explain agglomeration?”,American Economic Review, Vol. 89 No. 2, pp. 311-316.
Feyrer, J. and Sacerdote, B.I. (2012), “Did the stimulus stimulate? Effects of the American recovery
and reinvestment act”, Working Paper, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 21 June.
Fischback, P. and Cullen, J. (2013), “Second world war spending and local economic activity in US
counties 1939-1958”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 66 No. 4, pp. 975-992.
Fischback, P. and Kachanovskaya, V. (2010), “In search of the multiplier for federal spending in
the states during the great depression”, NBERWorking Paper no. 16561, Cambridge, MA.
Fuchs-Schuendeln, N. and Hassan, T.A. (2015), “Natural experiments in macroeconomics”, NBER
Working Paper no. 21228, Cambridge, MA.
Glaeser, E.L., Scheinkman, J.A. and Sacerdote, B.I. (2003), “The social multiplier”, Journal of the
European Economic Association, Vol. 1 Nos 2/3, pp. 345-353.
Greenstone, M., Hornbeck, R. and Moretti, E. (2010), “Identifying agglomeration spillovers:
evidence from winners and losers of large plant openings”, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 118 No. 3, pp. 536-598.
Jalil, A. (2012), “Comparing tax and spending multipliers: it’s all about controlling for monetary
policy”, Working Paper, Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA.
Moretti, E. (2010), “Local multipliers”, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
Vol. 100 No. 2, pp. 1-7.
Moretti, E. and Wilson, D.J. (2013), “State incentives for innovation, star scientists, and jobs:
evidence from biotech”, NBER Working Paper no. 19294, Cambridge, MA.
Nakamura, E. and Steinsson, J. (2014), “Fiscal stimulus in a monetary union: evidence from US
regions”, American Economic Review, Vol. 104 No. 3, pp. 753-792.
Ramey, V. (2011), “Can government purchases stimulate the economy?”, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 49 No. 3, pp. 673-685.
Serrato, J.C.S. and Winegender, P. (2014), “Estimating local fiscal multipliers”, Working Paper,
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, CA, 30 March.
Shoag, D. (2013), “Using state pension shocks to estimate fiscal multipliers since the great
recession”, American Economic Review, Vol. 103 No. 3, pp. 121-124.
Siegfried, J. and Zimbalist, A. (2000), “The economics of sports facilities and their communities”,
















































Sumner, S. (2013), “Why the fiscal multiplier is roughly zero”, Mercatus on Policy, available at: http://
mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Sumner_FiscalMultiplier_MOP_090313.pdf (accessed 7 July 2016).
Svennson, L.E.O. (2003), “Escaping from a liquidity trap and deflation: the foolproof way and
others”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 145-166.
Wilson, D.J. (2009), “Beggar thy neighbor? The in-state, out-of-state, and aggregate effects of R&D
tax credits”, The Review of Economics & Statistics, Vol. 91 No. 2, pp. 431-436.
Wilson, D.J. (2012), “Fiscal spending jobs multipliers: evidence from the 2009 american recovery
and reinvestment act”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 4 No. 3,
pp. 251-282.
Wray, L.R. (2012),Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary
Systems, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY.
Corresponding author
Ryan Murphy can be contacted at: Rhmurphy@smu.edu
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
539
Beggaring thy
neighbor
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 S
ou
th
er
n 
M
et
ho
di
st 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
, R
ya
n 
M
ur
ph
y 
A
t 0
9:
02
 0
1 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
6 
(P
T)
